We investigate open-bid protocols termed price-demand procedures in combinatorial auction problems. Instead of requiring buyers to reveal their entire valuation functions directly, the auctioneer gradually gathers information by offering price vectors and requiring demand responses to each buyer. The auctioneer continues to calculate the 'provisional' profile of valuation functions in a history-dependent manner and check whether the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for this profile are revealed in the resultant history. Once these are revealed, the auctioneer ends the procedure and determines the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time. With the assumptions of revealed preference activity rule and connectedness, this paper shows that the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time is always the same as that associated with the true profile, even though the provisional profile is generally different from the true one. Only our procedures can achieve the correct VCG outcome. We further discuss the auctioneer's discretion and buyers' privacy concern.
Introduction
This paper investigates the combinatorial auction problem where multiple heterogeneous items are traded altogether. We examine the possibility of achieving the efficient allocation under the constraint of dominant strategy. The standard approach of mechanism design focuses on direct mechanisms and constructs a so-called VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves 1 ) mechanism. This approach requires a mechanism to incentivize each buyer to reveal her (or his) entire valuation function truthfully at one time.
Instead of such direct mechanisms, this paper considers dynamical protocols in the continuous time horizon, which will be termed price-demand procedures. The auctioneer continues to offer a price vector for all packages of commodities to each buyer, and require this buyer to reveal a set of packages as her demand set. Once the auctioneer succeeds to gather the sufficient information regarding the buyers' valuation function, she (or he) stops the procedure and determines the VCG outcome implied by the gathered information. Although this information is sufficient for achieving the correct VCG outcome, it is generally just a partial information about their valuation functions.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a class of price-demand procedures that successfully gather the sufficient information for achieving the correct VCG outcome at all times. Throughout this paper, we make the following two basic assumptions, i. e., revealed preference activity rule and connectedness. The assumption of revealed preference activity rule requires each buyer to reveal demand sets in the manner that there exists a single valuation function, associated with which, his revealed demand set is always the same as the set of all best responses. In other word, according to this paper's terminology, the realized history must be consistent with a single valuation function. The assumption of connectedness substantially restricts the discontinuity of price trajectories that the auctioneer makes.
With these assumptions, this paper introduces the following subclass of price-demand procedures, according to which, the auctioneer stops offering price vectors before identifying the buyers' entire valuation functions. At any time in the continuous time horizon, from the history of the offered price vectors and the buyers' demand revelations, the auctioneer calculates the 'provisional' profile of valuation functions. This provisional Hitoshi Matsushima is the corresponding author. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
profile is uniquely determined in a history-dependent manner as assigning to any revealed package the minimal relative valuations and to any unrevealed package the maximal absolute value. The auctioneer then checks whether the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for the provisional profile are revealed in the history. Once the auctioneer finds out the revelation of all these allocations in the previous history, the auctioneer ends the procedure and determines the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time.
Importantly, the provisional profile of valuation functions at the ending time is generally different from the true profile of valuation functions. Hence, the auctioneer does not know the true profile of valuation functions even at the ending time. In spite of this shortcut, we can show that the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time is always the same as that associated with the true profile of valuation function. Hence, by utilizing any such price-demand procedure, the auctioneer can always achieve the VCG outcome correctly.
We show that under the constraints of revealed preference activity rule and connectedness, any pricedemand procedure that ends before all such relevant allocations for the provisional profile are revealed in the history fails to achieve the correct VCG outcome. Hence, this paper could clarify a necessary and sufficient condition for a price-demand procedure to achieve the correct VCG outcome at all times.
As the previous works such as Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990) have pointed out, 2 the standard VCG mechanisms, wherein buyers directly announce the entire valuations for the enormous number of packages, has flaws in practice. Hence, in this paper, we search for the possibility of replacing such a standard practice with other practices such as dynamical price adjustments. Ausubel ( Ausubel 2004; demonstrated an open-bid protocol, termed Ausubel mechanism, as a replacement of the standard practice. Chen and Takeuchi (2010) experimentally showed the better performance of an open-bid protocol, termed iBEA auction, than the standard practice. There exist many other relevant works such as Gul and Stacchetti (2000) , which examined their respective open-bid version of the VCG mechanism. Parkes and Ungar (2002), , Lahaie and Parkes (2004) , and Mishra and Parkes (2007) introduced an involved market equilibrium notion, termed universal competitive equilibrium, which is defined as a buyer-dependent price vector that is not only a competitive equilibrium but also a competitive equilibrium without any single buyer. In our price-demand procedures, the provisional profile of valuation functions at the ending time implies a universal competitive equilibrium for the true profile of valuation functions. In this case, we can regard our price-demand procedures as the dynamical processes of finding out a universal competitive equilibrium.
It is sufficient for achieving the correct VCG outcome that the auctioneer makes the following 'detail-free' contractual agreement with the buyers:
i. The auctioneer continues to offer a price vector to each buyer under the constraint of connectedness, and requires each buyer to reveal a demand set under the constraint of revealed preference activity rule.
ii. This procedure continues until the history occurs that reveals the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for the provisional profile.
iii. The auctioneer ends the procedure within a time limit, and achieves the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time.
In this contractual agreement, the buyers do not need to know the detail of price-demand procedure that the auctioneer actually follows. Because of this detail-free nature, the buyers can leave the selection of price-demand procedure the auctioneer's discretion. In particular, the auctioneer can make the selection of price-demand procedure even contingent on his private signal that includes non-trivial information regarding the buyers' valuation functions. It is often that a buyer is afraid that any information about her valuation function, which is not necessarily relevant to the allocation problem, is leaked to the public. In this case, the auctioneer can preserve such a buyer's privacy concern by selecting a well-behaved 'shortcut' procedure. The extent to which the information regarding a buyer's valuation function is leaked to the public is well described by the resultant provisional valuation function at the ending time as well as the set of all revealed packages. The auctioneer can save such irrelevant information leakage by utilizing his private signal and stopping the procedure as soon as she find out that the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer are all revealed. Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990) argued about buyers' privacy concern, and pointed out the difficulty of hiding the revealed inputs by using cryptography. This paper assumes that all such inputs are automatically leaked to the public. With this assumption, the auctioneer's careful selection of a shortcut procedure is quite substantial.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 models the combinatorial auction problem. Section 3 introduces price-demand procedures and the assumption of revealed preference activity rule. Section 4 introduces the assumption of connectedness, defines provisional valuation functions, and then shows the main result of this paper. Section 5 explains the auctioneer's signal-contingent selection of price-demand procedure. Section 6 argues issues on information leakage. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We investigate the combinatorial auction problem wherein ≥ 1 heterogeneous items are traded altogether. Let ≡ {1, ..., } denote the set of all items. The set of all buyers is denoted by ≡ {1, ..., }, where ≥ 2. An allocation is defined as ≡ ( 1 , ..., ), where ⊂ implies the package of items that is assigned to buyer , and we assume ∩ = for all ≠ . Let denote the set of all allocations. An allocation without buyer ∈ is defined as ≡ ( ) ∈ \{ } , where ⊂ , and we assume ∩ ℎ = for ℎ ≠ . Let denote the set of all allocations without buyer ∈ .
A valuation function for buyer ∈ is denoted by ∶ 2 → + , where we assume quasi-linearity, ( ) = 0, and
which implies that any additional assignment gives a positive value. This paper does not need any more restriction on a valuation function. Let denote the set of all valuation functions for buyer . Let ≡ ∏ ∈ and
An allocation ∈ is said to be efficient for a profile of valuation functions ∈ if
Let * ( ) ⊂ denote the set of all efficient allocations for ∈ . An allocation ∈ without buyer is said to be efficient for a profile of valuation functions without buyer
denote the set of all efficient allocations without buyer for − ∈ − . A direct mechanism, hereinafter a mechanism, is defined as = ( , ), where ∶ → denotes an allocation rule, and ∶ → denotes a payment rule. Let ( ) = ( ( )) ∈ ∈ , = ( ) ∈ , ∶ → , and ( ) = ( ( )) ∈ ∈ . A mechanism is said to be efficient if
A mechanism = ( , ) is said to be VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves, or pivot) if it is efficient and
Note that a VCG mechanism = ( , ) satisfies strategy-proofness in the sense that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, i. e., for every ∈ , ∈ , and̃∈ ,
Price-Demand Procedure
Instead of requiring each buyer to reveal her entire valuation function at one time, we consider a dynamical procedure that gradually gathers information through the auctioneer's price adjustments.
A price vector for buyer ∈ is denoted by = ( ( )) ⊂ ∈ 2 , where ( ) = 0, and
Let denote the set of all price vectors for buyer . Let ≡ ∏ ∈ and ≡ ( ) ∈ ∈ .
We consider the continuous time horizon [0, ∞) 4 and an open-bid protocol termed a price-demand procedure, denoted by ( , ), wherein = ( ) ∈ denotes a pricing rule, and ∶ → [0, ∞) denotes an ending rule. We will define later on.
At any time ∈ [0, ∞), the auctioneer offer a price vector = ( ) ∈ to each buyer ∈ , and requires her to reveal a set of packages = ( ) ⊂ 2 as her demand set. 5 We permit to include the null package , while we do not permit to be empty. (That is, we permit = { }, but not = .) Importantly, the auctioneer can offer different price vectors across buyers.
A combination of the offered price vector and the revealed demand set ( , ) ∈ × 2 2 \ { } is said to be consistent with a valuation function ∈ for buyer if is the set of all best response packages to for , i. e.,
A history for buyer ∈ up to time ∈ (0, ∞) is denoted by
where we denote ℎ ( ) = ( ( ), ( )). A history ℎ is said to be consistent with ∈ if ℎ ( ) is consistent with for all ∈ [0, ). Let ℎ 0 denote the null history. Let ( ) denote the set of all histories for buyer up to time that is consistent with . Let
, ℎ = (ℎ ) ∈ ∈ , and 0 ≡ {ℎ 0 }. Based on these notations, we define a pricing rule = ( ) ∈ as
At any time ∈ [0, ∞), where the history ℎ ∈ has occurred, the auctioneer offers the price vector (ℎ ) ∈ to each buyer ∈ .
For every ℎ ∈ , we define the set of all valuation functions for buyer with which ℎ is consistent as
For every ℎ ∈ , we define the set of all packages that buyer reveals in the history ℎ by
Let ℎ = ℎ ( , ) denote the history up to time that occurs when the buyers continue to reveal their demand sets in the consistent manner with ∈ , i. e., ℎ ( , ) ∈ ( ), and
where we denote ℎ ( , ) = (ℎ ( , )) ∈ , and
Throughout this paper, we assume revealed preference activity rule, which requires each buyer to reveal demand sets in the consistent manner with a single valuation function at all times. In other words, for any buyer , at any time , the occurred history ℎ must satisfy
With this assumption, we can describe any observation of a buyer's behavior as the consequence of this buyer's selection of functioñ∈ as a proxy; she continues to reveal the set of all best response packages for her selected proxỹ.
The auctioneer stops offering price vectors at the ending time given by = ( ) ∈ [0, ∞), where we assume that for every ∈ (ℎ ) and ′ ∈ (ℎ ),
Note that this assumption is necessary, because the auctioneer cannot directly observe the true profile of valuation functions. Whenever ′ ∈ (ℎ ( ) ( , )), the resultant history must be the same between and ′ , i. e.,
Based on these assumptions, we define the set of all possible histories as
A mechanism = ( , ) is said to be consistent with a price-demand procedure ( , ) if for every ℎ ∈ ( , ), ∈ (ℎ ), and ′ ∈ (ℎ ),
This consistency regarding a price-demand procedure implies that at the ending time, the auctioneer succeeds to gather the sufficient information for achieving the allocation and the payment vector implied by correctly.
Note that this gathered information may be just a partial information about the true profile of valuation functions.
The following lemma shows that whenever a mechanism is efficient and consistent with a price-demand procedure, the allocation implied by this mechanism must be revealed in the history up to the ending time.
Lemma 1:If a mechanism = ( , )is efficient and consistent with a price-demand procedure( , ), then, for every ∈ , ( )is revealed in the historyℎ ( ) ( , ), i.e., ( ) ∈ (ℎ ( ) ( , )).
Proof: See Appendix A. Suppose that ( ) = , and it was not revealed. We can assume without loss of generality that the valuation for the null package , ( ( )) = ( ) = 0, is very small compared with any non-null package. This implies that any efficient allocation never assigns buyer the null package . This is a contradiction.
Suppose that ( ) ≠ , and it was not revealed. We can assume without loss of generality that there is a proper subset ⊂ ( ) such that ( ( )) is greater than but very close to ( ). We can improve the welfare by assigning buyer instead of ( ), and assigning some buyer ≠ ∪ { ( )\ } instead of . This is a contradiction.
Connectedness and Provisional Valuation Functions
A history ℎ for buyer up to time is said to be connected if for every ∈ (0, ),
In a connected history, the auctioneer never makes a price vector jump to any price vector that he has never offered before, i. e., the discontinuity of price trajectory takes places only if the price vector is equal to the price vector that was already offered at some previous time.
The following lemma shows that the auctioneer can calculate the difference in valuation for any buyer between any pair of packages correctly whenever the history is connected and this buyer revealed both packages.
Lemma 2:For every connected historyℎ ∈ and{ , ′ } ⊂ (ℎ ), there uniquely exists ( ,
Proof: See Appendix B. Throughout this paper, we assume that the auctioneer never makes a discontinuous price trajectory except for the case that the price vector is the same as the price vector that was already offered in some previous time. In other words, we assume the pricing rule to be connected in the sense that if for every ∈ (0, ∞), ∈ , and ∈ , the history ℎ ( , ) ∈ is connected. With the assumptions of connectedness and revealed preference activity rule, the following proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a VCG mechanism that is consistent with a price-demand procedure, i. e., it shows a necessary and sufficient condition for a price-demand procedure to achieve the VCG outcomes correctly.
Proposition 3:There exists a VCG mechanism that is consistent with a price-demand procedure( , )if and only if for everyℎ ∈ ( , ), there exist * (ℎ ) ∈ (ℎ ), and
and
Proof: See Appendix C. The necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 3 implies that irrespective of any profile of valuation functions, the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for this profile are all revealed in the history up to the ending time. According to Lemma 2, if the efficient allocations with and without any buyer are all revealed, the auctioneer can correctly calculate the difference in valuation between the efficient allocation and the efficient allocation without any single buyer. This correct calculation guarantees the achievement of the correct VCG outcome.
Importantly, we can interpret a price-demand procedure that satisfies eqs. (3) and (4) as the procedure in which the auctioneer continues to calculate the 'provisional' profile of valuation functions in a history-dependent manner and check whether the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for this provisional profile are all revealed.
Formally, for every ∈ , ∈ [0, ∞), and connected history ℎ ∈ , we define the provisional valuation function [ℎ ] ∈ as follows. Assume [ℎ ] ( ) = 0. Fix an arbitrary package that belongs to (ℎ ), which is denoted bỹ∈ (ℎ ). For every ∈ (ℎ )\{̃}, we specify
and for every ∉ (ℎ ),
Hence, by definition, we can regard the provisional valuation function as assigning the maximal absolute value to any unrevealed non-null package. Let The following lemma shows that the provisional valuation function [ℎ ] assigns any revealed package ∈ (ℎ ) with the minimal possible valuation in relative terms. Lemma 4:For every ∈ [0, ∞), connected historyℎ ∈ , and ∈ , it holds that ∈ (ℎ )if and only if for every ∈ (ℎ ),
In this case, for every ∈ (ℎ ),
Proof: See Appendix D.
The following theorem shows that the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 3 can be replaced with a condition implying that the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for the provisional profile are revealed in the history up to the ending time.
Theorem 5:There exists a VCG mechanism that is consistent with a price-demand procedure( , )if and only if for everyℎ ∈ ( , ),
Proof: See Appendix E. The auctioneer continues to check whether the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for the provisional profile are revealed. The properties eqs. (5) and (6)require on a price-demand procedure that the auctioneer eventually find out these revelations for the provisional profile.
The provisional profile of valuation functions at the ending time is generally not the same as the true profile of valuation functions. Although the auctioneer gathers the information sufficient for achieving the VCG outcome correctly, it is generally just a partial information about the true profile.
Theorem 5 implies that any price-demand procedure, which always reveals the efficient allocations with and without a single buyer for the provisional profile at the ending time, can achieve the correct VCG outcome. Importantly, Theorem 5 shows that under the constraints of connectedness and revealed preference activity rule, only such procedures achieves the correct VCG outcome.
Note also that only such procedures can achieve the efficient allocation under the constraint of dominant strategy. With revealed preference activity rule, we can describe any observation of a buyer's behavior as the consequence of his proxy selection of valuation function. Since the auctioneer determines the VCG outcome for the resultant provisional profile, each buyer is willing to equalize her proxy to her true valuation function as a dominant strategy.
Signal-Contingency
Just by observing the history up to the ending time, the buyers can detect whether the auctioneer achieves the correct VCG outcome. In this case, the buyers do not need to know the detail of the price-demand procedure that the auctioneer actually follows. Hence, the buyers can leave the selection of price-demand procedure the auctioneer's discretion. Importantly, the auctioneer can make the selection of a price-demand procedure even contingent on her private signal that includes non-trivial information regarding the buyers' valuation functions.
To be more formal, at the beginning of the initial time 0, the auctioneer observes a private signal . The set of possible private signals is denoted by Ω. Contingent on , the auctioneer selects a price-demand procedure denoted by ( , ) = ( , ). We define a signal-contingent price-demand procedure by
A mechanism = ( , ) is said to be consistent with a signal-contingent price-demand procedure Γ if it is consistent with ( , ) for all ∈ Ω. Let us consider a mapping ∶ → Ω; the auctioneer observes the private signal given by = ( ) ∈ Ω when is the true profile of valuation functions. By observing it, the auctioneer recognizes that the profile of valuation functions belongs to the set −1 ( ) ⊂ and selects the corresponding price-demand procedure ( , ).
As an extreme case, let us consider the situation wherein the auctioneer observes the complete information regarding the profile of valuation functions:
The auctioneer can select the following price-demand procedure ( ) = ( , ), which is consistent with a VCG mechanism. At the initial time 0, the auctioneer offers the profile of price vectors that is a universal competitive equilibrium for = −1 ( ). This implies that the ending time ( ) is equal to the initial time 0. Hence, the auctioneer immediately identifies the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer correctly, and then succeeds to achieve the correct VCG outcome just at the initial time 0.
Information Leakage
We can regard (ℎ ) as describing the extent to which the information regarding buyer ′ valuation function is leaked to the public. Lemma 4 implies that (ℎ ) is uniquely derived from the provisional valuation function [ℎ ] for buyer as well as the set of all packages that buyer reveals (ℎ ). Hence, we can regard the combination of [ℎ ] and (ℎ ) as the sufficient statistics for the extent to which the information about buyer ′ valuation function is leaked to the public.
The auctioneer can preserve the buyers' privacy concern by selecting a 'shortcut' price-demand procedure that decreases the extent of information leakage. For example, consider a case of two buyers and two items, i. e., buyer 1, buyer 2, item A, and item B, in which, the profile of valuation functions is given by
and 1 ({ , }) = 2 ({ , }) = 100 + .
We assume that the auctioneer knows the form of valuation functions (by observing a private signal) but does not know the value of ∈ (1, ∞). The sets of all efficient allocations with and without any single buyer are as follows. If > 100, then * ( ) = {({ }, { })}, 2 * ( 1 ) = {{ , }} 1 * ( 2 ) = {{ , }}.
For this example, we investigate the following price-demand procedure. At the initial time 0, the auctioneer offers = ( 1 , 2 ) given by
Note that is the provisional profile at the initial time 0.
Case 1: > 100. At the initial time 0, each buyer reveals the set of all best response packages given by 1 = {{ }, { , }} 2 = {{ }, { , }}.
The efficient allocation ({ } , { }), the efficient allocation without buyer 2 { , }, and the efficient allocation without buyer 1 { , } for the provisional profile at the initial time 0 were all revealed at the initial time 0. Hence, the auctioneer can achieve the correct VCG outcome at the initial time 0:
The price-demand procedure ends at the initial time 0, leaking to the public just the following information:
1. Each buyer's valuation for { , } is greater than or equals 200.
2. Buyer 1's valuation for { } is greater than that for { }. Buyer 2's valuation for { } is greater than that for { }.
3. For buyer 1, the difference in valuation between { , } and { } is equal to 100. For buyer 2, the difference in valuation between { , } and { } is equal to 100.
Case 2: ≥ 100. At the initial time 0, each buyer reveals the set of all best response packages given by
The efficient allocations ({ } , { }), ({ , } , ) , and ( , { , }), the efficient allocation without buyer 2 { , }, and the efficient allocation without buyer 1 { , } for the provisional profile at the initial time 0 were not revealed at the initial time 0. The auctioneer adjusts the profile of price vectors = ( ) in the following descending manner: at each time > 0, Up to time 100 − , the buyers continue to reveal the same demand sets as the initial time 0. At time 100 − , the auctioneer offers = (100 − ) given by
and 1 ({ , }} = 2 ({ , }) = 100 + , and each buyer reveals the set of all best response packages given by
Note that the efficient allocations ({ , } , ) and ( , { , }), the efficient allocation without buyer 2 { , }, and the efficient allocation without buyer 1 { , } for the provisional profile at the initial time 0 were all revealed at time 100 − . Hence, the auctioneer can achieve the correct VCG outcome:
The price-demand procedure ends at time 100 − , leaking to the public just the following information:
1. Each buyer's valuation for { , } is equal to 100 + .
2. Buyer 1's valuations for { } and { }, and buyer 2's valuations for { } and { }, are all less than 50 + 2 .
Note that the above price-demand procedure dramatically saves the extent of information leakage. In particular, the auctioneer perfectly hides the irrelevant information about buyer 1's valuation for item B and the buyer 2 valuation for item A.
Remarks
Section 6 has shown an example of auction protocol design, according to which, the auctioneer can hide irrelevant information in a satisfactory manner. However, this example assumed that the auctioneer possesses sufficient information in advance about the valuation functions and utilize it for this design. A real auctioneer, however, generally possesses just a limited knowledge about the valuation functions, and therefore, fail to preserve privacy in such a satisfactory manner. Hence, real auctioneers, who hope to hide privacy as much as possible, will establish their respective measures of privacy, and then design protocols that can implement the VCG outcomes with the minimization of information leakage according to their respective measures. This paper made a theoretical investigation on the practical issue in auction. Hence, for the theoretical simplification, we assumed the continuum of prices and demands. A real auctioneer, however, more practically, designs a well-behaved protocol under the constraints of finite grid of price and demand, without making such continuum assumptions hypothetically.
According to these observations, it might be important from the more practical viewpoint to investigate on what kind of protocol with finite grids can minimize information leakage in terms of a fixed measure of privacy. This is a difficult problem to answer in pure theory, hence necessitating simulation analyses and algorithmic investigation in a more practical manner than in this paper.
Conclusion
This paper investigated price-demand procedures in the combinatorial auction problem, where, instead of requiring buyers to reveal their entire valuation functions directly, the auctioneer continues to offer each buyer a price vector and requires her to reveal a demand set. During the procedure, the auctioneer continues to calculate the provisional profile of valuation functions in the history-dependent manner, which is defined as assigning to any revealed package the minimal relative valuations and to any unrevealed package the maximal absolute value. The auctioneer continues to check whether the efficient allocations with and without any single buyer for the provisional profile are revealed. Once these allocations are revealed, the auctioneer ends the procedure and determines the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time.
With revealed preference activity rule and connectedness, we showed that the VCG outcome associated with the provisional profile at the ending time is always the same as that associated with the true profile, even 6 From eq. (1), we can select ′ ≠ with which ℎ ( ) ( , ) is consistent, i. e., ′ ∈ (ℎ ( ) ( , )).
Here, we can select ′ and ∈ \ { } in a manner that ′ ( ( )) − ′ ( ) is close enough to zero and ′ ( ( )) − ′ ( ) < ( ( ) ∪ ( )\ ) − ( ( )).
Let us specifŷ∈ bŷ= ,̂= ( ) ∪ ( )\ , and ℎ = ℎ ( ) ℎ ∈ \{ , }
C Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the "if" part as follows. Suppose that for every ℎ ∈ ( , ), there exist * (ℎ ) ∈ (ℎ ), and * (ℎ − ) ∈ (ℎ − ) for each ∈ , that satisfy eqs. (3) and (4) for all ∈ (ℎ ). Then, we can specify ∶ → in a manner that for every ℎ ∈ ( , ) and every ∈ (ℎ ), ( ) = * (ℎ ).
We can also specify ∶ → for each ∈ in a manner that for every ℎ ∈ ( , ) and every ∈ (ℎ ), ( ) = ∑ ∈ \{ } ( * (ℎ − ), ( ), ℎ ).
From Lemma 2 and eq. (4), it follows that
which along with eq. (3) implies that the specified mechanism = ( , ) is VCG. We prove the "only if" part as follows. Assume that = ( , ) is VCG and consistent with ( , ). Note from eqs. (7) and (2) that for every ∈ , every ℎ ∈ , and every { ,̃} ⊄ (ℎ ), there exists { ,̃} ⊂ (ℎ ) such that
( ) − (̃) ≠̃( ) −̃(̃).
Hence, for every ∈ , if either ( ) ∉ (ℎ ( ) ( , )) or This contradicts the supposition that is consistent with ( , ). Hence, we have proved that for every ∈ , ( ) ∈ (ℎ ( ) ( , )), and (ℎ ( ) ( , )) ∩ * ( − ) ≠ ∈ .
Suppose that there exist { ,} ⊂ , ∈ , and ∈ such that ∈ (ℎ ( ) ( , )), ∈ (ℎ ( ) − ( , )), ∈ * ( − ), and
